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CaseNo.20120165-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID W. WARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Defendant to prison, rather than probation, where Defendant pleaded guilty 
to aggravated assault, has a history of criminal behavior, and exhibited 
selfish, aggressive behavior on the night of the assault? 
Standard of Review. "The trial court has substantial discretion in 
conducting sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence, and [this Court] 
will in general overturn the trial court's sentencing decisions only if [it] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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findfsj an abuse of discretion/' State v. Patience, 944 R2d 381, 389 (Utah 
App. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2011). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts.1 
On October 10, 2011, after bickering with her boyfriend Defendant all 
day and late into the night, Melissa decided to give up and go to bed. R67, 
102. Defendant, however, persisted. He woke her up "complaining again 
over some random stuff/' Id. Melissa, after chiding him for watching 
pornography and telling him to delete it from his computer, told him "they 
were over" and again tried to fall asleep. Id. Defendant then turned up the 
computer speakers to full blast. Id. Melissa, exasperated, took the computer 
speakers away. Id. 
At this point, Defendant became increasingly aggressive and started 
threatening Melissa. Id. She responded by telling him to leave and that if 
1
 Because Defendant pleaded guilty before a preliminary hearing, the 
facts of the crime are taken primarily from the police's Warrantless Arrest 
Probable Cause Statement (R67) and the presentence investigation report 
(R102). 
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he did not, she would call the police. Id. Defendant grabbed Melissa's 
phone, preventing her from making the call. Id; see also Aplt. Br. 6. When 
she tried to leave the residence, Defendant would not let her. R67,102. At 
some point, he also slapped Melissa in the face. Id. 
When Melissa finally tried to escape by climbing out a south window, 
Defendant caught up to her, seized her around her throat in a chokehold, 
and continued to choke her until she passed out. Id. 
When Melissa regained consciousness, Defendant was gone. Id. 
Melissa went outside and called the police. Id. Defendant later returned 
and was arrested. Id. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony; one count of damage to or interruption of a communication 
device, a class B misdemeanor; and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony. R34-35. Upon defense counsel's motion, the trial court 
ordered a competency evaluation. R10-11, 12-16. In two independent 
evaluations, Defendant was diagnosed with bipolar and post-traumatic 
stress disorders, but both evaluators concluded that Defendant was 
competent to proceed with his case. R69-75, 76-84. Defense counsel 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stipulated that Defendant was competent to proceed. R105:2. The court 
found Defendant competent. R30; R105:2. 
At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel stated that the case had 
been resolved and that Defendant would accept a plea offer. R106:2; R36-45. 
Under its terms, Defendant pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault charge; 
in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining two charges. R106:2; R40. 
The State also agreed to (1) not recommend prison time at the sentencing 
hearing and (2) recommend a statutory reduction on the aggravated assault 
charge upon successful completion of probation. R106:2; R40. 
Before taking Defendant's plea, the court heard from Melissa, who 
stated, "I honestly think that he needs to go to prison/' R106:3. Melissa 
further stated that she was "going to have to relocate" because of her fear of 
Defendant. Id. She worried that "a protective order's not going to keep him 
away from me . . . . I don't want him to know where I'm living, because I 
fear for my life." Id. Melissa also believed that "he knew exactly what he 
was doing, and I don't think he feels bad at all." R106:5. 
During the plea colloquy, the court advised Defendant that "when it 
comes time to impose sentence, that's a decision that is mine alone." 
R106:13. The court explained, "I will consider carefully the recommen-
dations that are made to me by the State, by your attorney . . . but in the end 
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I am not bound to follow anyone's recommendation/' Id. The court then 
asked, "do you understand that?" Id. Defendant responded, "Yes, your 
Honor." Id. 
After accepting Defendant's plea, the trial court instructed Defendant 
to "cooperate fully in the preparation" of a pre-sentence report (PSI). 
R106-.15. The court then told Defendant that AP&P's recommendation "isn't 
binding on me, but it's important" Id. 
The PSI recommended that Defendant be placed on probation for 
three years and serve 180 days in jail. R101-2 (hereinafter PSI: ). The 
report detailed Defendant's criminal history, which included a simple 
assault committed in 2008, as well as an unlawful detention and 
interruption of a communication device committed in 2006. PSI:4. 
Defendant had been placed on probation following these convictions, but 
each time the probation was unsuccessfully terminated. Id. The PSI also 
indicated a prior juvenile felony conviction for sexual abuse of a child under 
14. Id. Defendant was placed on the sex offender residential program 
following this adjudication and probation was terminated successfully. Id. 
The PSI noted that Defendant was unemployed, had no current 
income, and owed $2,000 in back child support and $6,000 in other debts. 
PSI:2, 5. The PSI also related Defendant's report that he suffered sexual 
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abuse from his biological father and then later suffered physical abuse from 
his adoptive mother. PSL5. And it noted Defendant's extensive training in 
Brazilian Jiu-jitsu. Id. 
At the beginning of Defendant's sentencing hearing, the Mai court 
noted that the aggravating factors were "significant" and that its 
"inclination [wasj not to accept [AP&P's] recommendation, and sentence 
[Defendant] to the State Prison." R107:2-3. The court then heard from 
defense counsel. R107:3. 
Defense counsel first argued that this was a case involving two 
"people with mental health issues," and that it was "at least [a] two sided 
situation with both people being combatants." R107:3. Defense counsel 
then claimed that Defendant's "very serious mental health issues . . . take[] 
this out of the realm" of a prison case. R107:4. Referring to the two 
competency evaluations, defense counsel noted that Defendant is 
"extremely mentally ill" and that prior to his recent arrest, "he was 
functioning in society without any medication or treatment whatsoever." 
Id. Counsel concluded, "[bjeing . . . in jail has probably been helpful 
because he's had to focus to keep the log of medications . . . and they've 
been able to adjust it." Id. 
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The State argued that Defendant's criminal history indicated a pattern 
of "controlling and violent" behavior against women. R107:8. Referring to 
Melissa's victim impact statement, the State noted that "when [Melissa] 
would try to leave the relationship, [Defendant] would hold her down in a 
martial arts move, and force her to apologize and promise not to leave 
him." Id, In her statement, Melissa further described how, on the night in 
question, Defendant "was choking her to the point where her eyes felt like 
they were going to explode in her head, and she felt like she was dying/' 
R107:8-9. According to a victim impact statement submitted by Melissa's 
mother, Defendant also threatened to slash Melissa's tires if she ever tried to 
leave him. R107:9. Thus/the State explained, "I don't disagree with the 
Court's previous suggestion that this might be a prison case, and with that I 
would submit it on the recommendations." Id. Finally, the State noted that 
Melissa did not attend the sentencing hearing, because she was afraid to 
make a statement in Defendant's presence. Id, 
Defendant then addressed the trial court and expressed remorse over 
what he had done. R106:ll. 
Before announcing Defendant's sentence, the court articulated several 
aggravating factors, R107:12. The court noted Defendant's 2006 and 2008 
convictions "for behavior similar to that exhibited" in the present case. Id. 
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The court also addressed Defendant's behavior leading up to the assault, 
which it characterized as "selfish." Id. In addition, the court noted that 
Melissa's victim statement "ma[de] clear that whatever acts she took against 
[Defendant] were in defense of herself" and that Defendant's "response was 
far in excess of what was required to stop it." R107:13. Finally, the court 
discussed Defendant's training in Brazilian Jiu-jitsu. Id. The court 
concluded that Defendant "knowjs] that [he] can hurt people" and that 
Melissa "believed that [he was] going to kill her." Id. 
The court then found that "the only mitigating factor in the case" was 
Defendant's mental health. But the court noted there was no guarantee that 
Defendant would be "medication compliant" when he was let out of jail, 
and the court expressed concern that the probation department would not 
be able to properly monitor Defendant's medication compliance. R107:10, 
13-14. In its written order, the court also noted Defendant's age of 27 as a 
mitigating factor. R51. 
Based on these factors, the court sentenced Defendant to serve zero to 
five years in Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay a fine of $950 and 
restitution. R48-49; R50-52; R107.14. 
Defendant timely appealed. R54. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Defendant to 
prison. Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Moreover, 
Defendant has a history of violent criminal behavior and exhibited selfish 
aggression on the night of the assault. Under these circumstances, it was 
not inherently unfair for the court to sentence Defendant to prison instead 
of probation. 
ARGUMENT 
I-
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO PRISON 
RATHER THAN PROBATION 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced him to prison rather than probation, asserting that the court 
failed to consider certain mitigating factors and improperly considered 
other factors in aggravation. Aplt. Br. 8-16. Defendant did not preserve 
most of .his objections below and has not claimed plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. Accordingly, this Court should not reach the 
merits of his claim as to those objections. In any event, Defendant's claim 
fails on its merits. 
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A. Most of the objections underlying Defendant's claim were 
not preserved. 
It is well settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not 
be raised on appeal/' State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, \ 11, 177 P.3d 637 
(citation omitted). To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant "must enter 
an objection on the record that is both timely and specific." Id. "The 
objection must 'be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very 
error' of which [the party] complains." Id. (quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539, 546 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). This preservation rule "applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111,10 P.3d 346 (citations omitted). 
If a defendant "does not argue that exceptional circumstances or plain error 
justifies review of the issue," this Court will "decline to consider it on 
appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
At the sentencing hearing here, defense counsel primarily argued that 
Defendant's mental health took this "out of the realm" of a prison case. 
R107:4. Although counsel acknowledged that Defendant had "some 
violence" in his criminal history, counsel suggested that Defendant's 
criminal history was "not long" and that it, too, was "a result of trying to 
survive in society without medications for somebody who needs that." Id. 
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However, defense counsel never objected to the trial court's 
consideration of Defendant's prior record, his selfishness during the assault, 
or his martial arts training as factors in aggravation. R107:12-14. 
Defendant's claim as to these factors, therefore, was not preserved below, 
And because Defendant does not argue "exceptional circumstances or plain 
error" on appeal, this Court should not reach Defendant's claim as to these 
factors. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
B. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
sentencing Defendant to prison rather than probation. 
A "defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the [trial] court is 
empowered to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that will best 
serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest." State v, 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991). "The granting or withholding 
of probation involves considering intangibles of character, personality and 
attitude." Id. at 1049 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Consequently, the decision whether to grant or deny probation rests 
"within the discretion of the judge who hears the case." State v. Killpack, 
2008 UT 49, Tj 58,191 P.3d 17. An appellate court will reverse a trial court's 
sentencing decision only when it is "clear that the actions of the trial judge 
were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at ^ 18 
(quotations and citation omitted). Tnis occurs if "the actions of the judge in 
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sentencing were inherently unfak or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive 
sentence/7 State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations 
and citation omitted). Put differently, a court abuses its discretion only 
when "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Id. (alteration in original); accord State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 
1f 12, 84 P.3d 854. 
Here, the trial court sentenced Defendant to prison instead of 
probation based on the following aggravating factors: (1) Defendants two 
prior convictions "for behavior similar to that exhibited" in the current case; 
(2) Defendant's "selfish" and aggressive behavior on the night of the 
assault; and (3) Defendant's capacity to hurt the victim given his extensive 
martial arts training. R107: 12-13. Defendant cannot show that no 
reasonable person would agree with the trial court's determination. 
Defendant's prior convictions. First, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in considering Defendant's prior convictions —for unlawful 
detention and interference with a communication device in 2006 and for 
assault in 2008— as aggravating factors. Defendant argues that "the trial 
court's focus on the nature of the charges instead of the lack of severity was 
misguided." Aplt. Br. 11. Defendant further asserts that his criminal 
history "was more mitigating than aggravating" because he had only two 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
misdemeanors on his record and "had a period of crime free life for three 
and a half years prior to the current offense/7 Id. 
However, on both his 2006 and his 2008 convictions, Defendant failed 
to complete probation successfully. PSI:4. Moreover, both of those prior 
cases involved attempts by Defendant to control the women he was with, 
and Defendant showed similarly controlling but escalated violent behavior 
during the aggravated assault in this case. Specifically, after Melissa 
warned him that she would call the police if he did not stop threatening her, 
Defendant grabbed Melissa's phone away from her to prevent her from 
making the call. R67, 102. Then, when she tried to escape the house 
through a window, he caught her in a chokehold and choked her until she 
was unconscious. R67,102. 
Given Defendant's pattern of violent and escalating criminal activity, 
along with his repeated failure to successfully terminate probation, there 
was nothing "inherently unfair" or "clearly excessive" about the trial court's 
conclusion that these factors weighed in favor of a prison sentence. 
Montoya, 929 P.2d at 358. 
Defendant's selfish conduct. Second, contrary to Defendant's 
contention, the trial court could properly consider Defendant's aggressive 
and "selfish" behavior on the night of the assault as a factor in aggravation. 
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Defendant claims that both he and the victim "were acting immaturely and 
with selfishness/7 and concludes that this "character trait should not be held 
against [Defendant] as a factor in aggravation." Aplt. Br. 11. However, 
Defendant's conclusory remark does not show that the trial court erred, let 
alone plainly erred, in considering that prior to the assault, Defendant 
would not let Melissa sleep, but rather "ke[pt] after her, after her" and 
would not "let it go," until he finally engaged in the "horrible assaultive 
behavior." R107.-12. 
A "trial court has broad discretion in considering 'any and all 
information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence/" State v. 
Sweat, 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 
708 (Utah 1986)). In making this assessment, a trial court is "best situated to 
weigh the many intangibles of character, personality and attitude." Killpack, 
2008 UT 49, [^ 58. Moreover, the "exercise of discretion necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court." State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, *\\ 6, 
255 R3d 689 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Here, as the trial court noted, Defendant pled guilty to aggravated 
assault. R107: 13. The court accordingly accepted Melissa's description of 
the events leading to the assault over Defendant's version. Its decision to 
do so was permissible, given its "broad discretion" to consider information 
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that "reasonably" bore on Defendant's sentence. Sweat, 722 P.2d at 746. 
And according to Melissa, Defendant not only acted with "selfishness" on 
the night he assaulted her, but also with escalating aggression. R67, 102. 
The trial court was "best situated" to determine that Defendant's behavior 
was a factor in aggravation, Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ^ 59, and, contrary to 
Defendant's contention, did not err in giving it substantive weight at 
sentencing. 
Defendant's martial arts training. Finally, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in considering Defendant's extensive training in 
Brazilian Jiu-jitsu as a factor in aggravation. R. 170: 13. Defendant argues 
that "his martial art[s] training should not have been considered an 
aggravating factor as he clearly did not employ that training in a manner 
intended to hurt the victim." Aplt. Br. 12. In fact, Defendant contends that 
"it is possible that the discipline [he] had learned from his martial arts 
hobby actually gave him restraint." Id. at 13. 
But defense counsel himself admitted at sentencing that Defendant 
"has the potential to hurt people," that "[hje's much stronger," and that 
"[h]e has that ability to be a danger." R107:4. Defendant's actions on the 
night of assault confirmed this. As Melissa tried to escape from Defendant, 
he placed her in a chokehold to wrest her from a window, and he then 
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choked her until she was unconscious. R67, 102. In her victim statement, 
Melissa described how Defendant "was choking her to the point where her 
eyes felt like they were going to explode in her head, and she felt like she 
was dying/' R107: 8. 
Given these facts, the trial court acted wrell within its "broad 
discretion" to consider Defendant's ability to "hurt people" —as 
represented by his martial arts training—as an aggravator that "reasonably" 
bore on his sentence. Sweat, 722 P.2d at 746. 
Defendant's mental health. Next, Defendant claims that the trial 
court "quickly dismissed" Defendant's mental health issues and did not 
adequately weigh them as a mitigating factor. Aplt. Br. 14-15. However, it 
is well-settled that "the trial court is in the best position . . . to determine 
whether any '[o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation [should] weigh more 
than several factors on the opposite scale.'" State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 
200, 1f 9, 113 P.3d 992 (quoting State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 
1990)); accord State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420, f 31, 147 P.3d 497. 
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's assertion, the trial court did consider 
Defendant's mental health, and twice voiced its concern that a probation 
sentence would pose a risk that Defendant would not remain "medication 
compliant." R107:10,13-14. Given this, the court did not abuse its discretion 
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by concluding that Defendant's mental health issues favored sentencing 
him to prison, where his medication could be more consistently monitored. 
Other mitigating factors. Finally, Defendant argues that the trial 
court violated its obligation under State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), to 
recognize other mitigating factors. Aplt. Br. 15-16. This Court, however, 
"has repeatedly rejected the application of the Galli factors outside of cases 
involving consecutive sentences. Because consecutive sentencing is not at 
issue here, the statutory factors analyzed in Galli do not apply and are 
therefore not legally relevant." Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, ^ 8 (citations 
omitted). 
* * * * * 
In sum, given Defendant's criminal history, his failure to successfully 
complete probation for his 2006 and 2008 convictions, his aggressive and 
selfish behavior leading up to the aggravated assault in this case, and his 
potential for future violence, as represented by his martial arts training, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to 
prison rather than probation. See Montoya, 929 P.2d at 358. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant was sentenced to prison because of his criminal history, 
his selfish aggression on the night of the assault, and his potential for future 
violence. Defendant has not shown that no reasonable person would take 
this view. Defendant's sentence should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted on October !(?, 2012. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
I 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2011) 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
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(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow 
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77r Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(c) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court, 
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 63M-7-503 and 77-38a-401, shall enter: 
(i) a civil judgment for complete restitution for the full amount of 
expenses paid on behalf of the victim by the Utah Office for Victims of Crime; 
and 
(ii) an order of restitution for restitution payable to the Utah Office 
for Victims of Crime in the same amount unless otherwise ordered by the court 
pursuant to Subsection (4)(d). 
(d) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under 
Subsection (4)(c) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the 
restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and provide findings of its decision on the record. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime, 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
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(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under 
Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $100 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $200 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $350 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 
30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution 
for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shciLl 
pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of medical 
care provided to the defendant while in the county correctional facility before 
and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county 
correctional facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement 
provided under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary 
inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in 
Section 64-13e-102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6) (a) are the amount 
determined by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily 
inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county 
correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6) (a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable 
accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as 
defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for 
the inmate's disability. 
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(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this 
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, 
the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through 
(iv) and shall enter the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, 
the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for 
costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
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